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AbstrAct
Smart vehicle-to-grid (V2G) involves intelli-
gent charge and discharge decisions based on 
user operational energy requirements, such as 
desired levels of charging and waiting time. V2G 
is also supported by information management 
capabilities enabled by a secure network, such 
as a reliable privacy-preserving payment system. 
In this article, we describe the network securi-
ty and privacy requirements and challenges of 
V2G applications. We present a new network 
security architecture to support V2G. We pro-
pose a scheme with the following security and 
privacy-preserving features: anonymous authen-
tication, fine-grained access control, anonymous 
signatures, information confidentiality, message 
integrity, remote attestation, and a payment sys-
tem. This article is oriented toward practitioners 
interested in designing and implementing secure 
and privacy-preserving networks for smart V2G 
applications.
IntroductIon
Reductions in the cost of energy storage tech-
nologies coupled with increased investment in 
charging stations promise broader deployment of 
electric vehicles (EVs) around the world. Vehicle-
to-grid (V2G) exemplifies an integration of the 
electric grid with transportation systems. While 
the main goal of connecting the vehicle to the 
electric grid is to charge the vehicle, the elec-
tric vehicle can optionally inject power into the 
grid and provide ancillary grid services including 
demand (load) balancing, frequency regulation, 
and back-up power. In this article, we discuss 
V2G network security and privacy requirements 
and challenges. Electric vehicles are a very flexible 
resource; they can deliver a small portion of their 
batteries’ energy back to the grid (discharging) 
when the vehicle is stationary, which is about 22 
to 23 hours per day.
Several parties have significant interest in 
exploring the possibilities of V2G operations. 
These parties are the vehicle manufacturer, the 
vehicle battery supplier, the vehicle owner, the 
electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) owner, 
business/home users, the aggregation service 
provider, and the electrical utility. V2G also has 
important applications in military systems, where 
its integration at military installations can be used 
as a source for emergency power supply. Addi-
tionally, regulatory and governmental agencies 
also have particular motivations for investigating 
V2G. It is expected that the development and 
integration of V2G will increase market pen-
etration for plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) and 
renewable energy technologies. V2G can pro-
vide electricity operating reserves and assist the 
utility during times of peak demand and provide 
cost savings, as currently meeting the demands 
of peak power is a very expensive obligation for 
utilities. For these reasons, most electric vehicle 
manufacturers are currently investigating V2G 
applications.
V2G communication systems are different 
from other existing communication systems in 
several ways, such as vehicle mobility, geograph-
ic location of the vehicle, charge and discharge 
operations, driving pattern, and limited communi-
cation range. In terms of security, authentication 
in the V2G network needs to be fast and efficient 
in order to support a large number of EVs expect-
ed to participate in dynamic charging/discharg-
ing. Confidential information, such as vehicle 
identity, vehicle type, charging and discharging 
time, and charging station identity (CSID), needs 
to be protected.
Electric vehicles can communicate with the 
smart grid via distributed and/or centralized V2G 
networks for charging/discharging their batteries 
from/to the grid. To support V2G communica-
tions, a Dedicated Short Range Communication 
(DSRC) protocol is specifically designed for com-
munications-based active safety applications, such 
as vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infra-
structure (V2I) that includes IEEE 802.11p and 
IEEE 1609 wireless access in vehicular environ-
ments (WAVE) [1]. DSRC provides the commu-
nication between the vehicles and electric power 
systems. V2G systems need a tightly controlled 
spectrum for highly reliable communications. For 
instance, WiFi is not a preferred technology in 
V2G systems, as it can take multiple seconds to 
recognize nearby stations and complete the asso-
ciation. Active safety applications, such as V2G, 
V2I, and V2V, require immediate and extremely 
fast communication establishment with response 
times in milliseconds in which vehicles and devic-
es must recognize each other and transmit mes-
sages to each other. Hence, DSRC is preferred 
as a communication medium for communica-
tions-based active safety systems because it sup-
ports high speed, low latency, and short-range 
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wireless communication. In addition, DSRC also 
provides fast network acquisition, secure wire-
less interface, safety message authentication, high 
reliability, interoperability, immune performance in 
extreme weather conditions (e.g., rain, fog, snow, 
etc.), and supports high-speed vehicle mobility [2].
Unlike traditional payment systems that accept 
debit/credit cards operated by third parties, thus 
incurring high processing times, V2G systems have 
stricter financial transactions requirements. V2G 
systems require very fast, secure (through cryp-
tographic primitives with an advance amount in the 
vehicle owner’s account at the utility, similar to [3]) 
and efficient payment system with low processing 
times in order to accommodate charging and dis-
charging transactions by a large number of vehicles 
in the network. With large amounts of frequent 
transactions, a payment solution must also provide 
anonymity while preserving vehicle owner privacy. 
A V2G communications network is different from 
other traditional networks because information 
exchanges over the V2G network controls physical 
components in the electric distribution grid. As a 
result, information or network security breaches 
may cause the malfunction and/or damage of criti-
cal power infrastructure.
There exist security and privacy challenges in 
the V2G system that can significantly affect the 
practical use of this next generation technology. 
The information shared by the EVs and other V2G 
entities, such as the local aggregator (LAG), com-
munication and authentication servers, billing cen-
ter, and control center (CC), must be secured over 
the network. Privacy of personal and confidential 
information must be maintained. According to 
IEC 15118-2 [4], the use of transport layer securi-
ty (TLS) and unilateral authentication (server side 
authentication) are mandatory. However, mutual 
authentication (both server and vehicle authenti-
cation) is optional. Unilateral authentication is not 
considered secure, as it may result in redirection 
and impersonation attacks. It is risky to assume that 
all the LAGs and/or servers are trusted entities. We 
strongly emphasize that future generation V2G sys-
tems must provide mutual authentication between 
all vehicles and their respective LAGs or servers in 
order to ensure that communication happens only 
among legitimate entities in the network. Further-
more, since information misuse can lead to insider 
attacks, the LAG must not be able to recognize 
and/or keep track of any EV by its information and 
behavioral pattern.
The existing protocols/schemes do not dis-
cuss some of the possible attacks in the V2G net-
work, such as man-in-the-middle (MITM), replay, 
impersonation, redirection, flood-based denial 
of service (DoS), known key, and repudiation 
attacks. Since a large number of entities would be 
involved in future V2G networks, the generated 
overheads must be kept as low as possible. These 
overheads have direct impact on the optimal per-
formance-security trade-off [1].
V2G network securIty And 
PrIVAcy scenArIos
Let us illustrate network security for V2G appli-
cations by using an example. Many different enti-
ties participate in the V2G network, including 
the owner of the vehicle, the vehicle battery, the 
power company, and the payment management 
company. As illustrated in Fig. 1, the vehicles in 
the V2G network communicate with the smart 
grid through a collector or data aggregator for 
charging their batteries at the charging stations. A 
data aggregator is an intelligent device or set of 
devices that acts as a collector of available vehi-
cles’ power during discharging, and offers power 
supply to the vehicles through the charging sta-
tions. Aggregators have access to the authenti-
cation and communication servers in order to 
coordinate the charging. We now describe V2G 
security from the perspective of the various enti-
ties.
VehIcle owner PersPectIVe
Consider a scenario where a user parks their vehi-
cle in the parking lot of a restaurant and connects 
the vehicle to the charging station. The user pro-
vides setting preferences, such as selecting wheth-
er to charge or discharge the battery possibly by 
entering a bid, the minimum threshold for the bat-
tery level the user would like to have in the vehi-
cle, the minimum distance in miles that the user 
needs to travel, and the duration of time the user 
expects to be at the restaurant.
New requirements, such as the need to leave 
the restaurant sooner or to visit other destina-
tions, result in changes to the user options. The 
change in charging requirements will result in a 
new charging schedule for the vehicle. This sched-
ule is implemented by the charging station ener-
gy management logic, which involves a number 
of constraints and options, such as maximum 
charging speed, loading of the circuits and the 
utility transformer, and constraints associated with 
utility operations, such as local voltage levels. 
Assuming that logic exists to determine the new 
energy charging schedule, the question that we 
need to address is how can the system ensure that 
the necessary exchanges of information among the 
user, the vehicle, the charging station, the payment 
management company, and the utility take place 
in a secure manner.
VehIcle PersPectIVe
There can be physical as well as cyber security 
issues related to the vehicles. Alerts should be 
triggered for any integrity violations. How is the 
physical integrity of the vehicle preserved (i.e., 
the vehicle is not damaged) using a secure cyber 
layer? Also, communications among legitimate 
vehicles must be secured.
VehIcle bAttery PersPectIVe
Access control to install and uninstall each vehi-
cle’s battery may affect the security system (cyber 
security) of the vehicle knowing that the adversary 
can perform cyber attacks. How to control (grant 
or revoke) and securely verify legitimate access by 
individuals involved in the vehicle’s battery instal-
lation or replacement? And by extension, how to 
verify that these individuals deployed the appro-
priate configuration settings while installing or 
replacing a vehicle’s battery? Precise care should 
be taken in such a scenario using remote attesta-
tion with the server. A common requirement for 
the remote attestation is that a distinct security 
service that allows a trusted party to check the 
internal state of a remote embedded device, such 
A data aggregator is an 
intelligent device or set 
of devices that acts as 
a collector of available 
vehicles’ power during 
discharging, and offers 
power supply to the 
vehicles through the 
charging stations. Aggre-
gators have access to 
the authentication and 
communication servers 
in order to coordinate 
the charging.
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as a vehicle’s battery, should be allowed. Supply 
chain cyber security should also be provided to 
the vehicle’s battery in order to minimize the risk 
of information theft, intentional damage, and mal-
ware activities.
electrIc utIlIty PersPectIVe
The main objective of the power company is to 
deliver reliable electricity to customers (through 
EV charging stations), and also to transfer power 
back from the vehicle to the grid during the dis-
charging operation. In order to accomplish this, 
the power company must ensure that various 
electrical quantities (such as voltages and power 
flows) in the circuits are maintained within oper-
ational limits. For instance, simultaneous charging 
of various vehicles in a circuit may create an 
electric overload in the transformer, or an under 
voltage condition. These conditions are both dan-
gerous and costly. The charging of various elec-
tric vehicles must therefore be coordinated and 
scheduled dynamically. This requires the real-time 
exchange of information between the vehicles, 
the charging stations, and the utility. Hence, net-
work security and privacy are of paramount rele-
vance since it may affect the physical behavior of 
the electric vehicles and other devices connected 
to the smart power delivery network.
bIllInG comPAny PersPectIVe
A real-time pricing system needs to be implement-
ed for billing purpose immediately following the 
charging or discharging operations. For the con-
sumed power units, a final bill can be generated 
on a weekly/monthly basis and/or based on pre-
paid and post-paid user categories, whereas the 
user is expected to be paid immediately after fin-
ishing each discharging operation. In the current 
scenario of the V2G system, the real-time state of 
charge (SoC) information of each battery is com-
municated to the controller or aggregator in order 
to figure out the pricing for real-time charging or 
discharging power units [5]. However, this vio-
lates the privacy of vehicles, as the aggregator 
may then be the source of the vehicles’ informa-
tion leakage and modification.
PrIVAcy And securIty chAllenGes
This section describes in more detail various priva-
cy and security challenges of V2G networks, which 
include: linkability with previous sessions, the pos-
sibility of security attacks, identity tracing, deriving 
location information, extracting vehicle preferenc-
es, and compromising message information. 
Information Privacy: Information privacy is 
referred to as the permissible use of information. 
Consumers have the right to privacy regarding 
energy consumption. To protect consumers’ pri-
vacy, power utilities or third parties are responsi-
ble for implementing right to access policies that 
ensure consumers’ information is accessed and 
used only for legitimate utility-related purposes. 
Consumers’ information, such as their identity, 
vehicle daily power usage and location, should 
not be made available to third-party service pro-
viders without the full knowledge and consent 
of the consumers. When utilities and third parties 
use information that is provided or entrusted to 
them, the information should be used according 
to the agreed purposes that protect the privacy 
of the consumers. Therefore, it must be required 
that third parties have in place appropriate securi-
ty mechanisms in accordance with the NIST Smart 
Grid Cyber Security Strategy and Requirements 
Figure 1. A scenario of smart charging and discharging in the V2G network.
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(NISTR 7628) [6] that allow access to information 
only within the context of authorized users’ offi-
cial capacity. Consumer data contains important 
pieces of information including specific times/
locations of electricity use, type of operation 
requested (charging or discharging) and/or vehi-
cles used. Analysis of this data can reveal consum-
er behavior, hence power utilities and third parties 
have a responsibility to ensure the appropriate 
level of protection over consumer information.
Information Security: Information security is 
commonly represented in terms of the confiden-
tiality, integrity, and availability of information. 
Information security comprises practices and pro-
cesses, such as encrypting the transmitted infor-
mation between the charging station and the 
aggregator, thus ensuring that the information 
is protected against any unauthorized access. 
Employing security mechanisms, such as hash or 
message authentication code at the aggregator, 
communication server, control center, and bill-
ing center, ensure that the message content is 
unaltered (i.e., information integrity is preserved) 
and the message is accurately received when sent 
over the network. It is also imperative that when 
needed, the information is available and accessi-
ble by the legitimate parties.
The security and privacy requirements of V2G 
networks extend the basic requirements of vehic-
ular networks and financial transaction networks. 
The V2G network has a higher level of scale and 
complexity due to the fusion and integration of 
technologies from several domains as well as in 
the diversity and large volume of stakeholders 
involved across industries. Some of these indus-
tries are transportation and its safety, information 
communication technology (ICT), investor-owned 
utilities and municipal power entities, EV and 
EVSE manufacturers, the energy commission, and 
third-party aggregator providers. As a result, the 
security and privacy challenges increase signifi-
cantly for V2G networks as compared to tradition-
al communication networks. The uniqueness of 
the V2G network requires charging and discharg-
ing of the mobile vehicle’s battery across central-
ized and distributed networks, a secure payment 
system with debit as well as credit functionalities 
for the vehicle owner at large because of frequent 
charge and discharge of the battery, remote 
attestation: control and verification of legitimate 
access to allow battery installation and uninstalla-
tion securely, and performing different operations 
(addition/multiplication) over the encrypted data, 
such as computing aggregated power demand 
needed for a certain area. There is no such need 
for performing operations over encrypted data 
in traditional smart phone payment systems. The 
V2G system deals with such operations in order 
to monitor total supply and demand of power in 
each geographic area.
Next, we enumerate traditional security and 
privacy challenges as well as unique challenges 
for V2G networks.
PrIVAcy chAllenGes
The privacy challenges in the V2G network are 
the following. 
How to Keep a Vehicle’s Identity and its 
Location Information Untraceable from the 
Aggregator? The identity of the vehicle may be 
compromised [5, 7], as the aggregator retrieves the 
vehicle’s information and can misuse it by passing 
the information to an adversary. The aggregator 
or operator can also keep track of vehicle-specific 
information, such as the location of the charging 
station and how long a vehicle was at that charging 
station. The timing patterns of the owner of the 
vehicle can also be traced, if the vehicle frequently 
charges or discharges at a specific charging station.
How to Protect the Privacy of the Vehicle’s 
Other Preferences? Revealing the vehicle owner’s 
selection of performing charge or discharge opera-
tion and SoC of each vehicle’s battery (current bat-
tery status and percentage of battery the vehicle 
owner wishes to charge or discharge) leak private 
information to the collector or aggregator [5, 8].
An adversary can retrieve this information and 
store user history. User history can reveal infor-
mation about when the vehicle owner frequently 
moves from one location to another on a daily 
basis, where do they go on the weekends, how 
far they travel in a day, which parking lot they use 
most often, and which bank they frequent most 
often.
What Information is Required for Billing? The 
control center or the bill center requires the user 
and vehicle identity and SoC related information 
of the vehicle’s battery, such as the identity code 
of the battery, whether the charge or discharge 
operation is selected, battery SoC to check 
whether the battery is fully charged (and thus can-
not charge anymore), fully discharged (and thus 
cannot discharge anymore), or in a charging or 
discharging state, how much battery level was 
charged or discharged and in what duration, and 
the amount of power units consumed during 
charging or discharging for billing purposes. This 
charge or discharge data can reveal private infor-
mation about the vehicle’s battery and its owner.
securIty chAllenGes
Security challenges in the V2G network are dis-
cussed below:
What if a vehicle misbehaves? A vehicle may 
misbehave in a certain way, such as providing 
wrong information to the aggregator. The oper-
ator needs to first verify whether a vehicle has 
conducted a wrong attempt or it has been com-
promised by the adversary, and then run a pro-
cess of repudiating the vehicle from accessing the 
V2G network.
Is There a Linkability Issue? It may be possible 
that the adversary can obtain the user’s daily rou-
tine information by linking previous connections 
with the current one. It may also happen that in 
a current session the same information is resent 
as it was sent in a previous session. An unlinkable 
process is required where the outcome of each 
session must be different so that the adversary 
cannot correlate captured information between 
sessions.
What if an Adversary Performs Attacks? An 
adversary may perform attacks over the V2G 
network, such as MITM attacks, replay attacks, 
redirection attacks, impersonation attacks, repu-
diation attacks, and flood-based DoS attacks. The 
proposed solution for the V2G network must be 
able to defeat such attacks. The following sce-
narios describe different attacks over the V2G 
network.
Consumer data contains 
important pieces of 
information including 
specific times/locations 
of electricity use, type 
of operation requested 
(charging or discharg-
ing) and/or vehicles 
used. Analysis of this 
data can reveal con-
sumer behavior, hence 
power utilities and third 
parties have a respon-
sibility to ensure the 
appropriate level 
of protection over 
consumer information.
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Impersonation Attack: If the adversary knows 
the identity and/or session key of the victim vehi-
cle or the aggregator, it can perform an imperson-
ation attack. There are two possible cases of this 
attack:
• Case-1: The Adversary Impersonates the Vehicle: 
The adversary uses a fabricated identity, gen-
erates a hash of the message, and sends the 
complete message to the respective aggregator 
on behalf of the victim vehicle.
• Case-2: The Adversary Impersonates the Aggre-
gator: A malicious aggregator sends fabricat-
ed information to the vehicle on behalf of a 
legitimate aggregator. The information may 
include the victim aggregator’s identity and a 
fake response to the vehicle’s request.
MITM Attack: The adversary may build an 
active connection between the vehicle and the 
aggregator or the communication/authentication 
server as enumerated in the following cases:
• Case-1: Key-Exchange by the Adversary: The 
adversary can establish a connection with the 
vehicle and the aggregator or the server. The 
adversary can generate a shared secret key if 
the vehicle/server’s private key is compromised 
or if the source entity’s identity and signatures 
are not verified.
• Case-2: The Adversary as a Rogue Aggregator: 
The adversary may install a fake aggregator, 
extract information provided by the vehicle and 
later use this information to access the system 
from a legitimate aggregator.
• Case-3: The Adversary as an Insider Attacker: 
A friend who has access to the vehicle, and 
knows the security keys, can perform mali-
cious activities without the owner of the vehicle 
knowing.
• Case-4: The Adversary Tries to Extract Secret 
Information: The adversary can try to extract 
information from the messages transmitted 
between the vehicle and the aggregator during 
protocol run.
Replay and Injection Attack: The adversary 
can intercept, inject, or re-send previously sent 
messages in order to perform a replay attack.
Redirection Attack: The adversary can advertise 
itself as a legitimate aggregator over the network, 
and as a result, legitimate vehicles connect to the 
malicious aggregator and are then compromised.
Known Key Attack: The adversary can cor-
relate previously generated known keys in an 
attempt to extract some useful information.
Repudiation Attack: The owner of the vehi-
cle or their friend may deny performing specific 
actions, operations, or transactions, thus resulting 
in a repudiation attack.
Flood-Based DoS Attack: The adversary can 
perform a DoS attack by sending a dispropor-
tionately large number of charging or discharging 
requests to the aggregator, establishing half-open 
connections and refusing to complete the con-
nections, thus eventually exhausting the network 
resources of the aggregator. This would create a 
denial of service for legitimate vehicles in need of 
power services.
unIque V2G chAllenGes And chArActerIstIcs
A V2G system is a cyber-physical system (CPS) 
consisting of interacting elements with physical 
input and output instead of stand-alone devices, 
while the traditional system such as a mobile pay-
ment system is not a CPS. Unlike the smart phone 
payment system where only payment information 
is compromised in the event of any attack, the 
V2G system not only deals with information modi-
fication over the communication network but also 
its effect on the power system. Hence, the V2G 
system regularly runs power algorithms, such as 
power flow, state estimation, and contingency 
analysis.
We also discuss the unique challenges and 
characteristics of the V2G networks.
Dynamic Participation: Electric vehicles can 
dynamically join and leave networks without influ-
encing ongoing communications. The vehicles 
may connect to the charging station individually 
or in a group. This dynamic participation of the 
vehicles presents novel challenges with coordi-
nating charging schedules across the network in 
order to smooth out energy demand.
Vehicle Mobility: The vehicles may connect 
to the charging station in the home or vis-
iting area networks. The home area network 
refers to the geographic area where the vehi-
cle resides and is registered, whereas the vis-
iting area network includes locations outside 
the home area of the vehicle. Generally, the 
smart phone payment systems, such as Alipay, 
a third-party online payment platform, do not 
protect the sender’s identity, that is, they do 
not provide anonymity. A payment system in 
the V2G system supports the charging and dis-
charging payment transactions, providing user 
anonymity during the entire transaction even 
when an EV transacts in a visiting area.
Centralized and Distributed Networks: The 
existing power grid is operated as a central-
ized entity, whereas the smart grid is designed 
to work in a distributed manner. However, the 
smart grid needs to work in both modes until the 
migration is completed. An example of operating 
in both modes is when the vehicle’s charging 
and discharging is performed in the distributed 
network, whereas only the vehicle’s discharging 
is allowed in the centralized network [1, 9]. The 
V2G system requires the distributed and cen-
tralized networks to charge and discharge the 
battery of the vehicle at a charging station along 
with a secure payment system to support these 
operations.
Role-based Vehicles and Payment System: The 
electric vehicle acts as energy consumer, energy 
storage, and energy supplier while performing 
charge, idle, and discharge operations, respec-
tively. Further, the state of the vehicle’s battery 
can be charging, fully-charged, and discharging. 
The traditional approaches that only consider the 
vehicle as energy consumer are not directly appli-
cable in V2G networks.
The V2G payment system is different from 
the smart phone payment system because 
unlike the unidirectional (one-way) smart phone 
payment system wherein the consumer always 
pays the vendor, the V2G payment system is 
a bi-directional (two-way) payment system for 
charging and discharging payment transactions 
with the owner of the EV being able to either 
buy power from the grid as an energy consum-
er or sell power to the grid as an energy pro-
vider.
Unlike the smart phone 
payment system where 
only payment informa-
tion is compromised 
in the event of any 
attack, the V2G system 
not only deals with 
information modification 
over the communication 
network but also its 
effect on the power 
system. Hence, the V2G 
system regularly runs 
power algorithms, such 
as power flow, state 
estimation, and contin-
gency analysis.
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ProPosed ArchItecture for A 
secure smArt V2G network
In this section, first we discuss the security and pri-
vacy objectives that are required to be achieved, 
and then describe our proposed architecture for 
the V2G network.
securIty objectIVes
The proposed solution must satisfy the following 
security objectives in the V2G network:
Mutual Authentication: The V2G network 
must provide mutual authentication between the 
vehicles and the aggregator and/or the regis-
tration authority. This process helps protect the 
network against redirection and impersonation 
attacks. The vehicles at a charging station must be 
able to communicate with the aggregator secure-
ly, and no unauthentic or malicious vehicle should 
be able to connect for charging or discharging 
operations.
Information Confidentiality: This is one of the 
mandatory objectives of the V2G network. Private 
information must be secret or hidden in order to 
provide confidentiality to the transmitted informa-
tion. Encryption is used to provide confidentiality 
to the messages.
Message Integrity: The integrity of all trans-
mitted messages in the V2G network must be 
maintained. For each sent message, it is required 
to verify whether any violation has taken place 
during message transmission.
PrIVAcy objectIVes
The privacy of the EVs must be preserved when-
ever EVs access charging stations. Also, the pri-
vacy of the consumers must be maintained when 
the utilities share consumer data with third-parties. 
The proposed solution must satisfy the following 
privacy objectives in the V2G network:
Identity Anonymity: The identity of the vehicle 
should not be disclosed, as an untrusted aggre-
gator can also receive the vehicle’s information 
and can misuse the information by passing it to 
an adversary.
Vehicle Untraceability: The scheme should 
maintain vehicle untraceability so the adversary 
cannot distinguish whether two different messag-
es (with pseudo-identity and/or vehicle’s location, 
battery status, and selection of charging/discharg-
ing with timing information) originated from the 
same or two different vehicles. The scheme sat-
isfies untraceability if the adversary cannot guess 
the correct message-vehicle pair with a probability 
higher than random guessing.
Forward Privacy: Forward privacy is similar to 
untraceability but with additional capabilities. Two 
identical messages are generated. One of the two 
messages is passed on to the adversary. Forward 
privacy is maintained if the adversary, without 
having either a secret or session key, is still unable 
to trace previous sessions.
ProPosed ArchItecture
We propose a new architecture for secure smart 
charging and discharging of vehicles as shown 
in Fig. 2 that involves m-charging stations, at 
most n-electric vehicles (and/or hybrid vehicles) 
charging or discharging at a charging station, k-ag-
gregators geographically distributed, r-communi-
cation servers at different locations, and one or 
more authentication servers in the network. The 
uniqueness of the proposed architecture involves 
the dynamic verification support for charging and 
discharging of the vehicle battery by anonymous 
signatures, a secure payment system support for 
frequent financial transactions by the vehicles by 
using an anonymous payment system, remote 
attestation support for control and verification 
of legitimate access to allow battery installation 
and uninstallation securely by using anonymous 
authentication and fine-grain access control, and 
other supporting modules for performing differ-
ent operations (addition/multiplication) over the 
encrypted data, such as computing the aggregat-
ed power demand needed for a certain area by 
using homomorphic encryption. Our proposed 
system architecture includes a scheme with vari-
ous security and privacy features, such as:
1) Anonymous authentication and fine-grained 
access control
2) Anonymous signatures
3) Information confidentiality and message integrity
4) Remote attestation
5) Payment system in the V2G network. 
We summarize the V2G security and privacy 
requirements with these features of our scheme 
in Table 1 in order to achieve the desired goals.
Functional Description of the Proposed V2G 
Network Architecture: Figure 2 presents the over-
view of the proposed architecture, where the 
scheme executes in five different steps ((1) to (5), 
yellow arrow). Figure 2 shows the communication 
between an aggregator (LAG) and a communica-
tion server (ComS). Similarly, the scenario can be 
extended with several aggregators and communi-
cation servers. Vehicle owners connect their vehi-
cles (EV11, EV12, …, EVmn) to charging stations for 
charging or discharging their batteries. The owner 
provides its input preferences (SoC) and then 
waits for the system to process the inputs. The 
aggregator, deployed over the wireless network 
(i.e., DSRC), concentrates vehicle information and 
forwards that information to the communication 
server over the wide area network, i.e., long term 
evolution (LTE). The communication servers are 
responsible for securely receiving the vehicles’ 
information, communicating with the authentica-
tion server, control center, and billing generation 
and payment management center, and finally for-
warding the control center’s decision of grant-
ing/revoking the requested operation based on 
the demand-supply requirements of the vehicles. 
The communication server transmits the vehicles’ 
received information, such as pseudo-identities 
and secret parameters, to the authentication serv-
er. The authentication server verifies whether the 
participating vehicle belongs to a legitimate set 
of vehicles in the network, and sends a response 
back to the communication server. This process 
can be executed in a batch, given that many 
communication servers can request the vehicle 
verification simultaneously. Thereafter, the com-
munication server interacts with the control cen-
ter and performs demand-supply analysis for the 
specific application. If the control center allows 
the requested operation (charging/discharging), 
the communication server notifies the vehicle and 
then transmits some of the vehicle’s information 
Forward privacy is 
similar to untraceability 
but with additional 
capabilities. Two 
identical messages are 
generated. One of the 
two messages is passed 
on to the adversary. 
Forward privacy is main-
tained if the adversary, 
without having either a 
secret or session key, is 
still unable to trace 
previous sessions.
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to the billing center. The billing center verifies the 
vehicle information and performs the debit or cred-
it transaction depending on the service request-
ed operation. Finally, the process loop is closed 
when the vehicle undertakes and completes the 
approved charging or discharging operation.
The different parts of the proposed V2G net-
work architecture interact in the following way:
Step 1: First, the vehicle connects itself to 
the charging station for charging or discharging 
the battery. The proposed architecture provides 
identity anonymity and vehicle untraceability by 
running the “Anonymous Authentication and Fine-
Grained Access Control” module with appropri-
ate access control policy.
Step 2: Anonymous data transfer takes place 
between the vehicle and the aggregator. The 
aggregator establishes a connection to trans-
mit private and confidential information of the 
vehicle securely using techniques such as addi-
tively homomorphic encryption. The aggregator 
forwards the received vehicle’s information to the 
communication server in a secure manner. The 
communication server sends a part of the infor-
mation to the authentication server for vehicle 
identity or pseudo-identity verification through a 
dynamic accumulator, and also transmits other 
parts, such as the aggregated power demand to 
the control center.
Step 3: The authentication server verifies the 
vehicle’s identity and other secret information 
by techniques such as dynamic accumulator in a 
batch, and sends its response back to the com-
munication server. The authentication server also 
verifies trust security services, such as the state 
of the battery of each vehicle, using the “Remote 
Attestation” module.
Step 4: The control center uses the received 
information (in step 2) to analyze demand-supply 
of the power at regular intervals, and announc-
es its decision to accept/reject the charging/
discharging vehicle’s request to the communica-
tion server. The communication server notifies 
the vehicle about the control center’s decision. 
During the entire process, confidentiality and 
integrity of the information must be maintained 
by the “Information Confidentiality and Mes-
sage Integrity” module. If the vehicle needs to 
edit its preferences or needs to reconnect to the 
charging station within a session, the vehicle has 
to provide its anonymous signature with other 
details using the “Anonymous Signature Scheme” 
to the aggregator, which then forwards the infor-
mation to the communication server for further 
processing.
Step 5: After the completion of the vehicle’s 
charging or discharging operation, the process 
flow is directed toward the Billing Generation and 
Payment Management Center (BGPMC), which 
uses the “Payment System” module to credit or 
Figure 2. Proposed architecture of smart charging and discharging in the V2G network.
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debit the transaction amount depending on the 
operation performed by the vehicle.
Note that anonymous authentication is dif-
ferent from anonymous signature. Anonymous 
authentication is a means of authorizing a user 
without identification. Anonymous authentica-
tion helps the recipient verify that the sender is 
a legitimate user of the system. An anonymous 
group/ring signature scheme proves that the 
messages received by the recipient were sent 
by a legitimate sender. In the proposed scheme, 
anonymous authentication proves that the sender 
belongs to a set of legitimate users. If the sender 
verification is successful, the user is authenticat-
ed for a session based on the expiration time of 
the session. On the other hand, the sender uses 
an anonymous signature scheme using its own 
privacy key and the public keys of other users 
while sending a message to the recipient, and the 
recipient verifies that the signature was generated 
by a legitimate user. The authentication process 
ensures that the user is legitimate to the system 
while the signature ensures that the message was 
generated and sent by a legitimate user.
Information confidentiality helps prevent 
MITM attacks. The use of random numbers or 
timestamp values with transmitted messages pre-
vents replay attacks. Verifying the correct location 
of the vehicle by the communication server stops 
redirection attacks. Mutual authentication pro-
vides protection against impersonation attacks. 
The use of digital signatures defeats repudiation 
attacks. Verifying half-open connection requests 
of the malicious vehicles by the server prevents 
flood-based DoS attacks. If the server does not 
receive a response from the vehicle, the half-open 
connection is terminated by the server.
The following subsections provide a detailed 
description of the security and privacy related fea-
tures of the proposed architecture.
Anonymous Authentication and Fine-Grained 
Access Control: The V2G network requirements 
are different from typical authentication systems. 
It requires anonymous authentication of the vehi-
cles so that the aggregator cannot learn the vehi-
cles’ personal information. In other words, the 
scheme must maintain identity anonymity and 
untraceability properties. Only the authentication 
server knows and verifies the actual identity of 
the vehicle, but the intermediate entities, such as 
communication servers and aggregators, do not.
An option for vehicle verification could be the 
use of a trusted third party that provides resource 
access to the authentic users. However, the third 
party can be compromised externally or by mali-
cious insider operators. The third party can be 
replaced by a secure multi-party (vehicle) com-
putation (SMPC) technique using verifiable secret 
sharing that involves multiple vehicles comput-
ing an agreed function (such as addition, multi-
plication, and comparison of the secret shared 
values without knowing the actual secrets) with 
inputs from each vehicle in such a way that none 
of the vehicles can know the input of any other 
vehicle, and the only information each vehicle 
acquires from the SMPC computation is the pub-
lic output. Hence, no vehicle gets the complete 
secret, but only a part of it. A complete secret 
can only be reconstructed by the aggregator, if 
it receives more than a threshold number, say t, 
of the shared values. The SoC information (and 
also other information, such as traffic and acci-
dent related information) can be sent by each 
vehicle to all other vehicles it chooses to connect 
to. The aggregator then collects all the informa-
tion by grouping each SoC attribute, and uses this 
information to calculate the aggregated energy 
demand over the confidential data.
In fact, anonymous authentication can 
be achieved using various techniques, such as 
ring signature, blind scheme, and partially blind 
scheme. Electric vehicles in V2G networks are 
dynamic in nature, as many vehicles leave and 
join the network frequently. Therefore, forming a 
dynamic group at each distinct geographic area 
(for a single or a set of charging stations) can 
handle such situations. Once a dynamic group 
is formed, an initial key agreement is processed 
table 1. V2G security and privacy requirements with the features of our scheme.
Requirements 1 2 3 4 5
Vehicle owner perspective requirements 
Input information for charging or discharging ü  
Input user profile preferences ü ü
  • Minimum level of the battery needed ü ü
  • Distance to the destination place (miles to go) ü
  • Expected time to stay ü
Input sudden changes in the user preferences ü ü
  • Urgent move (waiting time is suddenly down to zero or a few 
minutes)
ü ü
  • New distance to be covered ü ü
Vehicle perspective requirements
Secure communication by the vehicles involve in charging and 
discharging of the power
ü
Connection of the vehicle to the legitimate aggregator or server ü
Detection of integrity violations ü
Battery perspective requirements
Control and verification of legitimate access to allow battery 
installation and uninstallation securely
ü ü
Utility or power company perspective requirements
Estimation of total power demand requirement over the encrypt-
ed data (at control center)
ü ü
Anonymous decision of grant or revoke charging and discharging 
of the vehicles (by control center)
ü ü
Secure communication between the charging station nodes and 
the utility
ü
Bill generation center perspective requirements
Secure transmission of the SoC information for billing purpose ü ü ü
Secure and privacy-preserved payment system for charging and 
discharging of the vehicles
ü
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that allows vehicles to join and leave the network. 
However, it is required to ensure that a change 
in the group structure will accurately change the 
corresponding group key in order to preserve key 
independence without affecting other vehicles’ 
participation.
Anonymity ensures that the aggregator can-
not know the identity of the vehicle, but rather 
only verifies that the vehicle belongs to an autho-
rized group of vehicles. This requirement can be 
achieved by using a dynamic accumulator with 
addition, evaluation, and deletion of the vehi-
cle. The proposed scheme for V2G networks 
should not be deniable. A scheme is deniable if 
the aggregator or server cannot verify that other 
parties (such as EVs) participated in the system. 
Non-deniability can be achieved in the network 
via zero knowledge proof, wherein an EV proves 
a true statement to the aggregator or server.
Additionally, a fine-grained access control pol-
icy is applied to manage large queues of public 
vehicles, priority service vehicles, and private 
vehicles [10]. The utility can also reserve some 
charging stations devoted only to priority-service 
vehicles.
Anonymous Signature Scheme: In order to 
protect vehicle identity while signing a message, 
blind signatures allow the aggregator to easily ver-
ify that the signature belongs to one of the vehi-
cles among a set of registered vehicles. However, 
the aggregator cannot identify the actual vehicle 
that had signed the message. The following are 
some strategies to achieve anonymous signatures.
Ring Signature and Group Signature: Ring sig-
natures can be used in situations where a queue 
is maintained by a charging station for providing 
services to a large number of vehicles. A small 
number of groups with limited vehicles can be 
formed from a large queue for efficient process-
ing. A vehicle can create a ring signature using 
the ordered public keys of all member vehicles of 
the group. One of the differences between ring 
signatures and group signatures is that ring signa-
tures are efficient (no group manager, no setup 
and revocation procedure, and no co-ordination), 
and do not require any trusted authority. Ring 
signatures also provide anonymity, whereas the 
anonymity of a signer can be revoked in group 
signatures, that is, the signer can be traced by a 
group manager. While generating a ring signa-
tures in a V2G network, any vehicle can choose 
any number of possible signer vehicles (including 
itself) and sign a message using its secret key and 
other vehicles’ public keys, even without receiving 
other vehicles’ approval.
For an ideal group signature scheme that sup-
ports a large group of vehicles, the length of the 
group public key, group private key, and signa-
tures should be independent of the number of 
vehicles in the group. In addition, the scheme 
should also enable adding new vehicles in the 
group without updating the group public key, 
and be able to handle group member revocation. 
Revocation efficiency can be improved by adopt-
ing a dynamic accumulator.
Blind Signature: Blind signatures are used in 
situations where a signer (vehicle) is required to 
sign a message without viewing its content. This 
blindness property is applicable in various applica-
tions, such as electronic voting, untraceable elec-
tronic cash, anonymous fingerprinting, unlinkable 
credentials, and so on. However, these signatures 
have shortcomings since the signer has no control 
over the message parameters. Some random val-
ues are embedded in the message, and thereaf-
ter the signer sends the message. After receiving 
the signed message from the signer, the recipient 
(aggregator or server) filters out the embedded 
values in order to get a valid signature [11].
Partially Blind Signature: Partially blind signa-
tures resolve some of the existing issues in blind 
signatures. For example, a blind signature gener-
ated by the signer needs to be regenerated after 
the previous signature expires. Since the signer 
does not know this information, it has to generate 
another signature as expected. This increases the 
overall overhead generated by the signatures. On 
the other hand, partially blind signatures allow a 
signer to explicitly declare the information agreed 
with the receiver. This information could be the 
creation time of the signature, the expiration time 
of the signature, and other required conditions. 
In fact, partially blind signatures are controlled 
by the signer while the blind signatures are con-
trolled by the receiver.
Threshold Blind Signature: A group of sign-
ers blindly participate in a process to generate a 
threshold blind signature, and the signature can 
only be verified by the signed values of at least a 
specified number of signers [12]. In fact, multi-se-
cret sharing is more applicable where different 
attributes of SoC can be signed and sent to the 
aggregator.
In summary, a partially blind signature is suit-
able for V2G networks because a vehicle can cre-
ate and send its signature with explicit information 
to the aggregator. More specifically, a restrictive 
partially blind signature can be used to maintain 
vehicle privacy, such as a vehicle’s identity pro-
tection. Furthermore, a threshold blind signature 
is applicable in a V2G network where a vehicle 
needs to communicate with the server in the vari-
ous stages of completing a task, such as reporting 
malicious behavior or incidents and multi-signa-
tures for secure transactions.
Information Confidentiality and Message 
Integrity: Information confidentiality and message 
integrity are strongly required in order to secure 
transmitted messages over a V2G communica-
tion network. Homomorphic encryption can be 
a good solution for securing aggregated informa-
tion. It maintains end-to-end information confiden-
tiality by enabling the transmission of encrypted 
messages from the vehicles to the aggregator. 
However, the aggregator cannot decrypt the mes-
sage information, but rather performs different 
operations over the data received from various 
vehicles, such as total aggregated battery energy 
demand. Furthermore, instead of an encryption 
scheme, another suitable solution is the use of 
a commitment scheme via perfectly binding or 
perfectly hiding that involves two phases: commit 
and reveal. In a V2G network, this commitment 
scheme allows a vehicle to choose a commit 
value (secret value) while keeping it hidden to 
others, but reveals the commit value to the aggre-
gator and/or control center later. Ciphertext-Poli-
cy Attribute Based Encryption (CP-ABE) can also 
be used to enable charging requests of the vehi-
cles without violating the privacy of their SoC 
A partially blind signa-
ture is suitable for V2G 
networks because a 
vehicle can create and 
send its signature with 
explicit information to 
the aggregator. More 
specifically, a restrictive 
partially blind signature 
can be used to maintain 
vehicle privacy, such 
as a vehicle’s identity 
protection.
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attributes. Additionally, a pseudo-identity for the 
EVs should be used during communications over 
the network while performing charge or discharge 
operations.
Maintaining message integrity is also required 
in a V2G network, as an adversary can alter mes-
sage information. An adversary can also tam-
per with messages sent from the vehicles to the 
aggregator, and as a result the aggregator calcu-
lates a wrong aggregated result and consequent-
ly performs the wrong supply-demand analysis. 
In order to provide message integrity, a hash or 
message authentication function (MAC) is used. 
Encryption and integrity can be used together as 
encrypt-then-MAC, MAC-then-encrypt, or encrypt-
and-MAC. Encrypt-then-MAC is considered the 
most secure mode.
Remote Attestation in the V2G System: Remote 
attestation enables a trusted device and the serv-
er to know that the running software provides 
a secure environment for the required oper-
ations to be performed [13]. This remote attes-
tation requirement in a V2G system is different 
from the traditional mobile payment system. The 
smart phone payment system deals with the user’s 
subscriber identity module (SIM) without a need 
for remote attestation of the device, i.e., a smart 
phone. On the other hand, a V2G system requires 
remote attestation whenever a battery of the vehi-
cle is installed or uninstalled. It is a distinct security 
service by which the authentication server can 
remotely verify the state of the battery of each 
vehicle.
Integrity measures are used to verify informa-
tion about the software, hardware, and config-
uration of the system. The hash values are used 
in the attestation process to verify the identity 
of the batteries by the remote server. The server 
trusts that the attested information is accurate, as 
it is signed by a trusted platform module (TPM) 
whose key is certified by the certified authority 
(CA). However, the user’s activities can be traced 
if one has access to the attestation key. Frequent 
update patches released for the vehicle may cre-
ate a problem, as new hash values are required 
to be made available to the server. Also, if TPM 
keys are compromised, revocation may be an 
issue. The feasibility of remote attestation with-
out trusted hardware should also be investigated. 
We should have such a scheme that resolves the 
user privacy concerns without the involvement of 
a trusted third party.
Payment Systems in a V2G Network: The 
V2G payment system should be very efficient and 
secure, and able to authenticate involved parties 
many times in a day to support smart charging 
and discharging. On the other hand, the tradi-
tional smart phone payment system need not be 
run so frequently. Smart charging allows a vehicle 
owner to charge and discharge its vehicle’s bat-
tery based on inputs, such as how long he wants 
to charge, what battery level he wishes to keep 
for the next day, after what battery level he wants 
to earn profit by discharging battery, and so on. 
This process frequently repeats, and bi-directional 
payment transactions take place depending on 
the charging operation. Also, the smart phone 
payment system does not provide privacy to the 
user identity over the network. The V2G system 
must require a privacy-preserved approach to 
hide critical information over the network. There 
are various forms of payment systems today, but 
many of them are not suitable for a V2G net-
work [3]. These payment systems are paper cash, 
e-cash, paypal, micro-payment, prepaid cash, and 
credit or debit card.
Paper cash provides anonymity, but it is not 
suitable for a V2G system due to the difficulties 
in managing large payments and security of the 
system. E-cash also provides anonymity by gen-
erating a transaction ID. Normally, e-cash is used 
for small-amount transactions, and also has a daily 
limit on the transaction amount. For a V2G sys-
tem, which requires frequent payment transac-
tions even in a single day, e-cash is not suitable. 
Paypal is a very commonly used third-party e-pay-
ment system. However, if the third party (Paypal) 
is not trustworthy enough, it may result in user 
privacy issues, such as location and time of a vehi-
cle performing charging or discharging operation. 
Furthermore, micro-payments are only suitable for 
small-amount transactions, and thus is not good 
enough to consider for V2G systems. Prepaid 
cash cards are the same as e-cash because you 
cannot receive payment for a lost card. Although 
prepaid cash cards provide anonymity, they are 
not suitable for a V2G system as they support 
only one-way transactions (charging/debiting the 
consumer) for the vehicle. Credit or debit cards 
support two-way transactions, but do not provide 
user anonymity. The details of the card may also 
reveal user-related information.
In conclusion, either the card payment solution 
must provide anonymity for large amounts of fre-
quent transactions, or there should be a new pay-
ment system that preserves user privacy and can 
also provide the required functionality. Recently, a 
new payment system, designed in [3], proposes a 
cryptographic solution with an in-car unit to store 
the identity and secret of the user. However, if an 
adversary has access to the user’s secret, it can 
spend the money in the user’s account. There-
fore, a new dynamic and robust payment scheme 
is required that can handle frequent transactions 
as well as large payment amounts during vehicle 
charging and discharging operations.
sPecIfIc securIty mechAnIsms for the V2G
In this section, we briefly discuss specific security 
mechanisms for electric vehicles in the V2G networks.
Vidya et al. [14] proposed a PKI model that 
incorporates intra-domain and inter-domain certifi-
cation management techniques using ECC implic-
it certifications in the V2G network, as regional 
transmission companies are tied together with 
power distribution and generation companies. 
Liu et al. [9] proposed a role-dependent scheme 
using hybrid cryptographic primitives (e.g., ring 
signature, fair blind signature, and proxy re-en-
cryption) in which a battery vehicle interacts with 
the power grid in different roles, that is, energy 
demand (i.e., as a consumer), energy storage, and 
energy supply (i.e., as a generator). Saxena et al. 
[1] proposed a scheme using a dynamic accu-
mulator based on a bilinear pairing that handles 
dynamic connect and disconnect for a number 
of vehicles from a charging station, and performs 
secure vehicle operations in the centralized and 
distributed V2G networks under home area and 
visited area scenarios.
The V2G system must 
require a privacy-pre-
served approach to hide 
critical information over 
the network. There 
are various forms of 
payment systems today, 
but many of them are 
not suitable for a V2G 
network. These payment 
systems are paper 
cash, e-cash, paypal, 
micro-payment, prepaid 
cash, and credit or 
debit card.
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conclusIon And oPen chAllenGes
This article presented the security and privacy chal-
lenges and requirements for smart V2G networks. 
An architecture has been proposed that provides 
anonymous authentication and fine-grained access 
control, information confidentiality and message 
integrity, remote attestation to grant or revoke 
common access, verification of battery installation 
and uninstallation procedure, and a secure pay-
ment system for handling large amounts of fre-
quent transactions with anonymity. We discussed a 
scheme in which by providing anonymous authen-
tication, the original identity of the vehicle can be 
hidden. Also, partially blind signatures and thresh-
old blind signatures are used to provide vehicles’ 
information to the aggregator without revealing the 
original identity of the vehicles. Fine-grained access 
control and remote attestation allow operational 
access specific to each vehicle and verification of 
legitimate access to allow battery installation and 
uninstallation of the vehicle securely. Furthermore, 
information confidentiality provides secure com-
munications between each vehicle and the aggre-
gator, whereas message integrity checks mandate 
that each message transmitted over the network 
is received unaltered. Also, new solutions are 
required to perform different operations over the 
confidential data. Finally, an anonymity-based pay-
ment scheme is required for handling secure finan-
cial transactions related to the vehicles’ charging 
and discharging operations. The proposed architec-
ture and the scheme provide clear guidelines for 
transmitting confidential information with integrity 
to intermediate devices or operators while anon-
ymously providing authentication, untraceability, 
and forward privacy. All of the aforementioned rec-
ommendations provide a framework for building 
a more secure and privacy-preserving smart V2G 
network, thus making all participants in the V2G 
network more impervious against security attacks.
Open challenges in the security and privacy of 
the V2G network include mobility and dynamic 
participation of the vehicles, role-based authenti-
cation and authorization, and accessibility in the 
centralized and distributed V2G networks in the 
home area and visiting area. The crucial challeng-
es for the future V2G network include analyzing 
cyber-security and cyber-physical security aspects 
of the V2G system. New methods need to be 
developed for the identification of cyber-security 
attacks, their detection, and prevention. Similarly, 
a cyber-physical V2G system needs to be explored 
under different attack scenarios, such as bad data 
injection, malicious command injection, and com-
munication delay in the network, and practical 
solutions that address V2G system vulnerabilities 
and misbehavior need to be developed.
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